Brzezkinski cautions the U.S. against its deeply embedded prejudice that Iran's possessing a nuclear weapon pushes us closer to the brink of waking up choking in a mushroom cloud.. He reminds us that we have coped with the U.S.S.R., China, Pakistan, North Korea, and India possessing nuclear weapons. (Of course he didn't mention Iran's concerns about Israel possessing nuclear weapons). Brzezinski in this case is applying an oxymoron by articulating realism to encourage a sanguinary posture toward Iran.
He drops all sanguinary overtures though in regard to Russia. In 1979 when he helped create the mujahideen he could claim this was an expedient effort necessary to defeat the Evil Empire. But, can he claim credibly today that expediency demands his continued belligerence toward Russia?
Both he and we should heed the warning of U.S. diplomat the late George F. Kennan who stated in an editorial published in the New York Times on February 05, 1997 that:
And perhaps it is not too late to advance a view that, I believe, is not only mine alone but is shared by a number of others with extensive and in most instances more recent experience in Russian matters. The view, bluntly stated, is that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era. [1]Mr. Kennan if we view the U.S. Empire's rhetoric and actions toward Russia, then, tragically, it is too late to advance your view. Who among the U.S. Empire is listening to your warning? Not Brzezinski. But, Mr. Kennan you thought the end of the Cold War presented an opportunity for a peace based on mutual cooperation and a realistic expectation of what is possible through such efforts, whereas the current U.S. elites believed it meant elevating their Empire into an omnipotent state determining the fate of humanity. It doesn't appear Kennan's hopefulness wasn't realistic given the U.S. agenda to move NATO eastward. Brzezinski's hopes were equally unrealistic, but, unlike Kennan, he believes the U.S. appears weak and soft, being mocked in Putin's shadow.
Rather than heed Kennan's warning, it is revealing that:
In 1989, Brzezinski quit his job at Columbia University where he taught since 1960 to work on Ukraine’s independent status plan. This marks the beginning of his compromise to prevent the resurgence of Russia as a superpower. He defended Russia’s integration to the Western system and the “geopolitical multiparty system” in the territory of the former Soviet Union. [2]
Brzezinski didn't just focus on pre-liberating Ukraine. I say "pre-liberation" insofar as Ukraine didn't become an independent sovereign state until 1991. Brzezinski has also devoted efforts to prevent Azerbaijan from being economically integrated into Russia.
His post in the U.S.-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce was no doubt awarded to position him best to conceive of a defense against a predictable Russian attempt to recreate the U.S.S.R. Brzezinski certainly has academic credentials but his connections to the "Establishment" are too well known to discuss here. Suffice it to say though that he continues to serve as a member of the Establishment's power structure that exerts significant influence of the geopolitics in the Eurasian landmass:
Zbignew Brezizinski sits on the Board of Directors of a rather impressive if little-known organization, the US-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce (USACC). The chairman of USACC in Washington had been Tim Cejka, President of Exxonmobil Exploration. USACC Board members, in addition to Brzezinski, included Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, and James Baker III. Scowcroft had been advisor on national security to Presidents Nixon, Ford, Bush Sr and Bush Jr. Baker was the man who traveled to Tbilisi in 2003 to tell Shevardnadze in person that Washington wanted him to step aside in favor of US-trained Saakashvili. Dick Cheney was a former USACC board member before he became Vice President. [3]Brzezinski and his colleagues have established significant links into the political and economic machinations of the former Soviet republic Azerbaijan. What makes this former Soviet republic important to the U.S. orbit of influence in this region? Its main city Beku is a major chokepoint on an oil and gas pipeline that flows from there through Tbilisi and through Ceyhan. The pipeline allows the U.S. to extract oil from Eurasia without relying on Russian pipelines. Of course nothing is wrong with forging relationships with nations that allow your more efficiently extracting critical energy supplies. It is the tactics used to accomplish that objective though that reveals sinister motives, which, if continued, will increase tensions in the region. Does his affiliations here create a conflict of interest for Brzezinski that reduces the reliability of his analysis of Russia? Brzezinski's harsh criticisms of Russia have occurred over so many decades that it is doubtful he is simply motivated by personal interest.
Brzezinski's comments made to the U.S. Congress on February 06, 2015 offer a vivid example of his chronically paranoid fears of Vladimir Putin:
I wonder how many people in this room or this very important senatorial committee really anticipated that one day Putin would land military personnel in Crimea and seize it. I think if anybody said that’s what he is going to do, he or she would be labeled as a warmonger. He did it. And he got away with it. I think he’s also drawing lessons from that. And I’ll tell you what my horror, night-dream, is: that one day, I literally mean one day, he just seizes Riga, and Talinn. Latvia and Estonia. It would literally take him one day. There is no way they could resist. And then we will say, how horrible, how shocking, how outrageous, but of course we can’t do anything about it. It’s happened. We aren’t going to assemble a fleet in the Baltic, and then engage in amphibious landings, and then storm ashore, like in Normandy, to take it back. We have to respond in some larger fashion perhaps, but then there will be voices that this will plunge us into a nuclear war. [4]
Brzezinski apparently experienced no night-dreams about the coup that overthrew Yanukovich. Brzezinski states that the West implied appeasement further encourages Putin's neo-Soviet imperialism. Of course, Brzezinski could consider other factors that could encourage Putin's geopolitical chess moves. The U.S. demonizing of Russia resonates images of the latter in the western media that it is more or less a neo-Soviet relic resorting to militarism in vain attempts to revive an Iron Curtain of sorts. On what basis does such demonization resonate at all given the fact that NATO's border had expanded from 1,200 miles away from Leningrad (renamed again Saint Petersburg) during the Cold War to as of 2008 a short 100 miles away. [5]. This NATO expansion seemed to violate terms to which both the U.S. , West Germany, and the U.S.S.R had agreed upon to end the Cold War. The terms of this agreement are subject to constant self-serving claims based on historical revisionism and legal and diplomatic constructs.
Perhaps Brzezinski expressed no concerns of the regime change in Kiev or NATO's eastward expansion because these events should have reduced Putin's influence in eastern Europe, thereby weakening Russia's power over the infamous and coveted Eurasian land bridge:
Brzezinski wasn't just a political consultant he was an active advocate. His advocacy was not motivated by adhering to political realism. Rather his advocacy was motivated by a maniacal focus on preventing a resurgent Russia from establishing a dominant position in that Eurasia land bridge, becoming a critical node in an economic structure linking Europe and Asia. His vision maybe faithful to Sir Halford Mackinder but not to those seeking a multi-polar stability.
Perhaps Brzezinski expressed no concerns of the regime change in Kiev or NATO's eastward expansion because these events should have reduced Putin's influence in eastern Europe, thereby weakening Russia's power over the infamous and coveted Eurasian land bridge:
FOR AMERICA, THE CHIEF (author's sic) geopolitical prize is Eurasia. For half a millennium, world affairs were dominated by Eurasian powers and peoples who fought with one another for regional domination and reached out for global power. Now a non-Eurasian power is preeminent in Eurasia-and America's global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained. [6]His expressing explicitly both the need for the U.S. to dominate Eurasia and exaggerated claims of Putin plotting to invade NATO suggests Brzezinski seeks continued U.S. domination there as the price of peace.
Brzezinski wasn't just a political consultant he was an active advocate. His advocacy was not motivated by adhering to political realism. Rather his advocacy was motivated by a maniacal focus on preventing a resurgent Russia from establishing a dominant position in that Eurasia land bridge, becoming a critical node in an economic structure linking Europe and Asia. His vision maybe faithful to Sir Halford Mackinder but not to those seeking a multi-polar stability.
Brzezinski's selective or flexible (depending on your point of view ) application of realism suggests he and Kissinger are two sides of the same coin. Kissinger's and Brzezinski's realistic approaches to Russia and Iran, respectively offer some hope that maybe an empire can pursue peace as a condition obtainable without first forcing all else into its own envisioned global order.
[1]. Kennan, George F. "A Fateful Error." New York Times. February 1997. http://web.archive.org/web/19970501051048/http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/gknato.htm
[2]. Lepic, Arhtur. "Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Empire's Adviser." Oct 22, 2004. Voltaire Network. http://www.voltairenet.org/article30038.html
[3]. F. William Engdahl. Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy In The New World Order. Published by edition.engdahl Wiesbaden. 2009. loc 947 of 4586. Kindle edition.
[4]. Zuesse, Eric. "The 'Democrat' Brzezinski Says Russia's Putin Wants to Invade NATO." March 06, 2015. Washington's Blog. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2015/03/democrat-brzezinski-says-russias-putin-wants-invade-nato.html
[5]. Sarotte, Mary Elise. 1989: The Struggle To Create Post-Cold War Europe. Princeton U of P. 2009. location 206 of 349.
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