Congress' belligerence toward Putin is too uniformly shared and expressed among its members to be dismissed as renegade, Churchillian lonely voices in the wilderness. This belligerence is so blatant and unrelenting that it renders meaningless terms once packed with so much rhetorical power such as "glasnost" and "perestroika." Those terms signified an opening up of a closed system. Or so it seemed. That opening of the Soviet's closed system was just a preliminary step necessary to lay a foundation for the U.S. to expand eastward.
Mikhail Gorbachev's cult of personality then experienced addition by subtraction. His stature rose as he helped engineer the U.S.S.R's downfall. He showed wisdom and grandiloquence by acknowledging that planned economies were mere patronage machines for the politburo. This maestro of perestroika 25 years later appeared to the West as a dull hack well past his prime when he claimed that just maybe the U.S. and NATO lacked credibility to act as arbiter legitimizing Crimea's actions. Gorbachev attempted to cite history as a precedent for supporting Crimea's referendum. Apparently he is still dizzy from flying on the Forbes corporate jet in the early 1990s. History is written by winners dumb ass. Either speak in service to the Empire or shut up. Sure he won the Nobel Prize, but that doesn't require much effort at making peace. Just ask his fellow prize winners Obama, Arafat, and Gore.
If Gorby needs a remedial course in knowing his post-soviet role, he should reread Zbignew Brzezinski's The Grand Chessboard. But, Gorby shouldn't waste his time. Congress has proven they don't need his pathos constructed by perestroika to justify its anti-Putin hysteria. He simply needed to look at the U.S. handling of its negotiations with the U.S.S.R. to determine the future structure of sovereignty among Europe's nations comprising NATO and the Warsaw Pact. If Gorby had done this, he should have inferred an ominous future featuring the U.S. demonizing of Russia.
The U.S. demonizing of Russia resonates images of the latter in the western media that it is more or less a neo-Soviet relic resorting to militarism in vain attempts to revive an Iron Curtain of sorts. On what basis does such demonization resonate at all given the fact that NATO's border had expanded from 1,200 miles away from Leningrad (renamed again Saint Petersburg) during the Cold War to as of 2008 a short 100 miles away. [4]. This NATO expansion seemed to violate terms to which both the U.S. , West Germany, and the U.S.S.R had agreed to end the Cold War. The terms of this agreement are subject to constant self-serving claims based on historical revisionism and legal and diplomatic constructs.
The Berlin Wall falling on November 09, 1989 seemingly offered both a hopeful finality to two superpowers' conflict waged with many proxy wars over 50 years, and the beginning of the cliche filled images of The End of History. These two superpowers' diplomatic moves showed less of a mutually executed ceasing of hostilities and, instead, more a decisive shift of power to the West. Gorbachev apparently failed to foresee this decisive shift of power.
During February 1990 U.S. Secretary of State James Baker met with Gorbachev to discuss their demands of each other in order to end the Cold War. The issue of German unification as non-NATO expansion was viewed by both parties thus:
Baker said that he had also explained to Gorbachev that a united Germany would choose to stay in NATO. 'And then I put the following question to him. Would you prefer to see a unified Germany outside of NATO, independent and with no U.S. forces or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO's jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position?' Baker quoted Gorbachev's response verbatim: 'Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable.' [5].
Those terms seem comprehensible and West Germany Chancellor Helmut Kohl at a subsequent meeting in 1990 "assured Gorbachev that 'naturally NATO could not expand its territory to the current territory of the GDR.'" [6]. Despite the apparent mutual agreement that NATO would not expand in the post-Cold War era, this crucial provision proved to be merely rhetorical. This term being reduced to mere rhetoric resulted according to the U.S. from Gorbachev's neglecting to state non-NATO expansion in writing as a precondition for ending the Cold War.
Of course, had Gorbachev insisted on non-NATO expansion be codified more explicitly in writing and through other formal measures, the U.S. could always resort to a convenient caveat of stating the underlying conditions have changed, necessitating our expanding NATO eastward to protect the former Soviet bloc from a resurgent Russia. The U.S. has expressed this concern as a justification for its continued meddling in East Europe, opposing Russia.
The U.S. can allay fears of NATO aggression by pointing out the anti-missile defense shield stationed in Poland and the Czech republic are by their nature "defensive," which can only repel a missile attack. Thus, NATO's actions in this case are defensive. Also, Russia demonstrates it naivete by claiming that the U.S. by stationing these anti-missile shields violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty which became effective in 1972. George W. Bush withdrew the U.S. from this treaty on June 13, 2002 because adherence to this treaty hindered the U.S. from developing defensive missile shields used to repel missiles launched by terrorist or rogue states like Iran. Does this reason really explain the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty?
So the development and deployment of ABM shields are intended to protect Europe and the U.S. from a ballistic barrage launched from Tehran. Right? If so, then why have "prominent" Republicans claimed that President Obama's canceling the ABM plan of the George W. Bush administration which would have placed interceptors in the Czech Republic and Poland was done to appease Russia. For instance, Mitt Romney stated on CBS's Face the Nation:
The United States should 'reconsider putting in our missile defense system back into the Czech Republic and Poland, as we once planned. As you recall, we pulled that out as a gift to Russia.' [7].Romney is being honest here insofar as the ABM shield in NATO was always intended primarily to intercept Russian missiles. Supporters of the ABM shield cited concerns of an Iran missile attack as an unconvincing pretext. What Romney and other Republicans neglected to mention is that although Obama scrapped George W. Bush's ABM plans, Obama has continued with a revised ABM plan. Obama's revised plan features:
a shield based on the Navy’s Aegis system, was designed to begin with Navy ships with SM-3 interceptors in the eastern Mediterranean and then progress to land-based SM-3s in Eastern Europe. [8]
Regardless whether these interceptors are deployed in regions close to Russia, the U.S. nuclear arms reduction establishments reiterates these ABMs are not deployed against Russia or China. http://www.armscontrol.org/blog/ArmsControlNow/2015-01-07/Removing-the-Missile-Defense-Obstacle-to-Deeper-Nuclear-Cuts
Yet, our parsing their word meanings of certain terms only offers a limited understanding of its objectives. A critical factor that motivates U.S. foreign policy, especially with Russia can be extracted from Zbignew Brezezinski's emphasis that any pretensions of world power demands gaining decisive influence in Eurasia, the great land bridge:
FOR AMERICA, THE CHIEF (author's sic) geopolitical prize is Eurasia. For half a millennium, world affairs were dominated by Eurasian powers and peoples who fought with one another for regional domination and reached out for global power. Now a non-Eurasian power is preeminent in Eurasia-and America's global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained. [9].Brezezinksi's thinking here sheds more light on U.S. motivations than any of its legalistic maneuvering when justifying its increased presence and influence in that region in the post-Cold War era. He wastes no time expressing concerns over Iran launching ballistic missiles as a camoflauge of the U.S. true reason for its continued military presence in that region. Brezizinski further makes his case of Eurasia being an indispensable jewel in any empire's crown:
Eurasia is also the location of most of the world's politically assertive and dynamic states. After the United States, the next six largest economies and the next six largest economies and the next six biggest spenders on military weaponry are located in Eurasia. All but one of the world's overt nuclear powers and all but one of the covert ones are located in Eurasia. The world's two most populous aspirants to regional hegemony and global influence are Eurasian. All of the potential political and/or economic challengers to American primacy are Eurasian. Cumulatively, Eurasia's power vastly overshadows America's. Fortunately, for America, Eurasia is too big to be politically one. [10].Brezizinski's rationale for continued U.S. engagement in Eurasia involves no mocking of Gorby for failing to state explicit demands in writing, or any pretensions that the U.S. possesses unique moral authority to dominate in that region. Instead, Brezizinki speaks directly of the primacy of pure power politics. We could dismiss Brezizinkski's analysis as that of an academic sitting in an ivory tower unconnected to any sinew of power. Except that he is not.
Brezizinski certainly has academic credentials but his connections to the "Establishment" are too well known to discuss here. Suffice it to say though that he continues to serve as a member of the Establishment's power structure that exerts significant influence of the geopolitics in the Eurasian landmass:
Zbignew Brezizinski sits on the Board of Directors of a rather impressive if little-known organization, the US-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce (USACC). The chairman of USACC in Washington had been Tim Cejka, President of Exxonmobil Exploration. USACC Board members, in addition to Brzezinski, included Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, and James Baker III. Scowcroft had been advisor on national security to Presidents Nixon, Ford, Bush Sr and Bush Jr. Baker was the man who traveled to Tbilisi in 2003 to tell Shevardnadze in person that Washington wanted him to step aside in favor of US-trained Saakashvili. Dick Cheney was a former USACC board member before he became Vice President. [11].Brezizinski and his colleagues have established significant links into the political and economic machinations of the former Soviet republic Azerbaijan. What makes this former Soviet republic important to the U.S. orbit of influence in this region? Its main city Beku is a major chokepoint on an oil and gas pipeline that flows from there through Tbilisi and through Ceyhan. The pipeline allows the U.S. to extract oil from Eurasia without relying on Russian pipelines. Of course nothing is wrong with forging relationships with nations that allow your more efficiently extracting critical energy supplies. It is the tactics used to accomplish that objective though that reveals sinister motives, which, if continued, will increase tensions in the region.
The events in Georgia beginning in 2003 and thereafter show the U.S. pretensions of enabling democracy there provide little more than platitude-filled rhetoric. Shevardnaze's corruption destroyed hope that any vestige from the Soviet era could forge a vibrant and functioning democracy. He abdicated power peacefully though in November 2003 after his party machinery being exposed for conducting a fraudulent election. The next election brought Saakashvili to the presidency. This peaceful transition proved so powerful that it motivated W. to express his reverence to the Georgian people in Tbilisi in a speech delivered on May 10, 2005:
Your most important contribution is your example...before there was a Purple Revolution in Iraq or an Orange Revolution in Ukraine or a Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, there was a Rose Revolution in Georgia....because you acted, Georgia is today both sovereign and free and a beacon of liberty for this region and the world. [12].In 2005, Bush could still attempt to speak without incurring excessive mocking of Iraq as a successful test case of revolution begetting democracy. Prior to W. Bush's stating Georgia's example as providing the first critical shade of the color revolutions to follow, the U.S. assisted Georgia's executing its peaceful Rose Revolution.
Was U.S. assistance motivated exclusively for the benefit of Georgians seeking to build democratic institutions ensuring their voice will be heard and heeded? It appears that they viewed Georgia not as a specific case with its own problems, but instead as a political, cultural, and social entity linked to a trend sweeping over the region:
Western assistance came in two forms: helping lay the groundwork for the elections by spreading democratic values and educating the public, and providing support during the revolution. Western funding for NGOs was important for civic education, informing the public on human rights, and so forth. But since the funding was foreign, the agenda was designed in western capitals and frequently focused on the entire region while neglecting problems specific to Georgia [sic added]. [13].If democratic institutions were not being built to address the specific challenges and concerns of the Georgian people, then what was the West motivation? Also, if this was a region-wide agenda, then shouldn't we further consider the possibility that it is pursuant to a strategic encirclement of Russia?
If the Rose Revolution provided a "beacon of liberty" to the world, then what beacon did Saakshavili's actions as president offer? The Rose Revolution made some progress in curbing corruption. But, Saakshavilli's actions as president demonstrated that despite whatever transformative skills he learned in becoming a westernized reformer, they failed to impart the will to resist the trappings of power as observed in the days preceding the 2012 election:
Since 2003, there has been no change of power through elections and in Monday'parliamentary's elections Saakashvili ruling United National Movement is determined to keep it that way. Electoral lists have been doctored, opposition figures and human rights activists have been attacked and arrested. [14].Saakashvili subsequently lost by a large margin in the next election that occurred in 2012. His creeping authoritarianism did not prevent another peaceful transfer of power. But, his authoritarianism also showed that the Rose Revolution was less about constructing democratic institutions and more about allying itself with a figure who supported U.S. goals, most notably NATO expansion eastward.
The U.S. revealed further their indifference to Georgia's domestic authoritarianism when they supported Saakashvili's decision to invade Ossetia and Ahkazia in the summer of 2008. Moreover, the U.S. publicly condemned this brief combat action as a resurgent Russian bear; meanwhile, copies of documents published by Wikileaks showed the U.S. blindly accepted Georgia's self-serving claims that Russian-support South Ossetians provoked this conflict, and that the U.S. Embassy staff in Tbilisi relied only on the claims coming directly from the Georgian government:
By 2008, as the region slipped toward war, sources outside the Georgian government were played down or not included in important cables. Official Georgian versions of events were passed to Washington largely unchallenged......The last cables before the eruption of the brief Russian-Georgian war showed an embassy relaying statements that would with time be proved wrong....
'Deputy Minister of Defense Batu Kutelia told Ambassador at mid-day August 7 that Georgian military troops are on higher alert, but will not be deploying,' one cable noted, as Georgian heavy military equipment was enroute to the confilct zone....Mr Kutelia's assurance did not stand, even in real time. In of the few signs of the embassy's having staff in the field, the cable noted 'embassy observers on the highway' saw about 30 government buses 'carrying uniformed men heading north.'.....Still the embassy misread the signs, telling Washington that while there were 'numerous reports that the Georgians are moving military equipment and forces,' the embassy's 'initial impressions' were that the Georgians 'were in a heightened state of alertness to show their resolve.'.........
In fact, Georgia would launch a heavy artillery-and-rocket attack on Tskinvali, the South Ossetian capital, at 11:35 p.m. on Aug. 7, ending a cease-fire it had declared less than five hours before.The bombardment plunged Georgia into war, pitting the West against Russia in a standoff over both Russian military actions and the behavior of a small nation that the United States had helped arm and train.
A confidential cable the next morning noted that Georgia's Foreign Ministry had briefed the diplomatic corps, claiming that 'Georgia now controlled most of South Ossetia, including the capital.' The cable further relayed that 'Saakashvili has said that Georgia had no intention of getting into this fight, but was provoked by the South Ossetians and had to respond to protect Georgian citizens and territory.'
Rather than emphasize the uncertainties, it added, 'All the evidence available to the country team supports Saakashvili's statement that this fight was not Georgia original intention.' Then it continued: 'Only when the South Ossetians opened up with artillery on Georgian villages' did the offensive begin.
This exceptionally bold claim would be publicly echoed throughout the Bush administration, which strongly backed Georgia on the world's stage. The cable did not provide supporting sources outside of the Georgian government. Instead, as justification for the Georgian attack the previous night, a Georgian government source, Temuri Yakobashvili, was cited as telling the American ambassador that 'South Ossetians continued to shoot at the Georgian villages despite the announcement of the cease-fire.'
The cable contained no evidence [sic] that Ossetian attacks after the cease-fire had actually occurred and played down the only independent account, which came from military observers in Tskhinvali from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. [15].
Given the U.S. public condemnation of Putin as the puppet master pulling the strings that caused this military aggression, and the subsequent revelation of Georgia's military provocation in Ossetia, why has the U.S. continued its constant demonizing of Putin and its blatant attempts to weaken and punish Russia? In the U.S mind the die has apparently been cast, and this trend toward World War Three continues, as demonstrated by events in Ukraine.
Several events provide good starting points to analyze U.S. meddling in the dysfunctional yet sovereign nation of Ukraine. The Orange revolution in 2005 and the Maidan revolution (or coup if judged by the actual chain of events) in 2013-14 are case studies of such meddling. Extensive reviews of both of these case studies has occurred, and most likely, persons following them have already concluded what they believe are the causal factors leading to both and their implications for future relations between the West and Russia. What deserves more analysis now is the composition of the Ukranian cabinet being formed in the aftermath of the October 26th 2014 election.
Recently elected President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko's resorted to morally questionable measures enabling his cabinet appointments to include the following persons:
The new Ukrainian Finance Minister, the one who will control the money and decides where it goes, is one Natalia A. Jaresko. She speaks fluent Ukrainian. Only problem—she is an American citizen, a US State Department veteran who is also a US investment banker. Now, the Ukrainian Constitution, prudently enough, stipulates that government ministers be Ukrainian. How then does our sweet Natalia come in?
The President of Ukraine, another Victoria Nuland favorite, the “Chocolate King” corrupt oligarch billionaire, Petro Poroshenko, made her a Ukrainian citizen in a bizarre ceremony the same day just hours before the parliament declared her Finance Minister. In justifying his astonishing move, Poroshenko declared, 'There are absolutely extraordinary challenges facing Ukraine…All this requires innovative solutions in the government…These decisions mean searching for candidates for the new government not only in Ukraine but also abroad.' [16].Once again, I will resort to the sophomoric logic and ask: "what if a well connected Russian with long ties to the Putin power base who, although a fluent Spanish speaker, was given instant citizenship in order to serve as the Finance Minister in any nation in latin america?" And, if such a Russian operative received instant citizenship within a latin american nation of which Russian diplomats were caught discussing regime change?
A true believer in the benevolence and unique skills of U.S. establishment figures to serve the better interests of Ukraine should see such a cabinet appointment as a positive action. One who has such a worldview would believe the ends justifies the means. I will assume here that Jaresko's appointment is at least partly motivated by expectations that she will help implement the "structural reforms" needed to meet the conditions for Kiev to receive loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) totaling $17 billion.
This $17 billion aid package seems like a dull, meaningless deal that is unworthy of any news coverage. This particular aid package has served as a wedge further severing Ukraine from its ties to Russia. Ukraine receiving this package is contingent upon their satisfying certain conditions, which if implemented place them in the beleaguered orbit of EU/IMF's Austerity Inc. In 2013 Ukraine President Victor Yanukovych opted not to accept this loan, deciding abruptly to accept a loan package from Russia. The Russian offer was for less money at $15 billion, but came with fewer conditions and included a "33% discount on the price of Russian natural gas." [17]. His choosing an aid package that seemed to impose less harm on his people ultimately cost him his presidency. His trenchant pattern of resisting closer ties to the EU and their and the IMF's austerity measures sparked the "Maidan" revolution, resulting in his abdicating power on February 22, 2014 and leaving Kiev.
Much media coverage of the Maidan revolution ignored the terms and conditions of the IMF $17 billion aid package which upon Yanukovych's rejection triggered the coup that removed him from power. His interim successor Arseny Yatsenyuk who in his post as acting Prime Minister in March 2014 accepted the terms needed to receive the IMF $17 billion deal. Ukraine must accept this particular loan package in order to receive additional financial support from the EU and US. Analysis conducted to assess the impact on Ukraine to implement these conditions will result in a 47% to 66% increase in personal income tax rates, and a 50% in gas bills." [18]. More specifically, the IMF's loan conditions require that Ukraine:
to increase natural gas and heating tariffs for consumers by 56 percent and 40 percent in 2014, respectively, and by 20 to 40 percent annually from 2015 to 2017. At the same time, as gas prices increase sharply, gas subsidies to end users will be completely ended over the next two years. [19].Many "progressive" voices and experts in the EU-US-IMF troika establishment assure us that shock therapy though painful will eventually place Ukraine on a path to prosperity (just like it has in Grecce, Latvia, Cyrpus, and Spain). Their assurances should comfort Ukranians and simple-minded people untrained and unqualified to foresee a braver new world awaiting those who sacrifice their immediate self-interest and pay tribute to Austerity Inc.
The U.S. implementing the Austerity regime also depended on Ukraine strategically placing persons in positions of power, enabling their further integrating Ukraine into the EU-US-IMF troika. Thus, prior to to the overthrow of Yanukovych, US diplomats voiced their support for his eventual successor in their well publicized phone conversation:
Voice thought to be Pyatt's: I think we're in play. The Klitschko [Vitaly Klitschko, one of three main opposition leaders] piece is obviously the complicated electron here. Especially the announcement of him as deputy prime minister and you've seen some of my notes on the troubles in the marriage right now so we're trying to get a read really fast on where he is on this stuff. But I think your argument to him, which you'll need to make, I think that's the next phone call you want to set up, is exactly the one you made to Yats [Arseniy Yatseniuk, another opposition leader]. And I'm glad you sort of put him on the spot on where he fits in this scenario. And I'm very glad that he said what he said in response.
Nuland: Good. I don't think Klitsch should go into the government. I don't think it's necessary, I don't think it's a good idea.
Pyatt: Yeah. I guess... in terms of him not going into the government, just let him stay out and do his political homework and stuff. I'm just thinking in terms of sort of the process moving ahead we want to keep the moderate democrats together. The problem is going to be Tyahnybok [Oleh Tyahnybok, the other opposition leader] and his guys and I'm sure that's part of what [President Viktor] Yanukovych is calculating on all this.
Nuland: [Breaks in] I think Yats is the guy who's got the economic experience, the governing experience. He's the... what he needs is Klitsch and Tyahnybok on the outside. He needs to be talking to them four times a week, you know. I just think Klitsch going in... he's going to be at that level working for Yatseniuk, it's just not going to work.
Pyatt: Yeah, no, I think that's right. OK. Good. Do you want us to set up a call with him as the next step?
First appeared:http://journal-neo.org/2014/12/18/foreign-bankers-rape-ukraine/
Nuland: My understanding from that call - but you tell me - was that the big three were going into their own meeting and that Yats was going to offer in that context a... three-plus-one conversation or three-plus-two with you. Is that not how you understood it? [20].
Their expressed preferences for "Yats" certainly foreshadowed this man who as Nuland claimed has "the economic experience" succeeding Yanukovych. Yats applied this experience to accepting the IMF loan package. How will such actions taken to terminate a democratically elected President who opted for closer ties with Russia not expose Ukraine as a pawn used by the U.S. to exert geopolitical influence in the region? How would President Obama and House Speaker Boehner react to a leaked phone conversation wherein Russian diplomats tell Mexican officials in the PAN that they if they seize power from the PRI that they need to accept loan packages from Brazil and/or Venezuela, and make repayments to both nations in currencies other than U.S. dollars? Unfortunately, the U.S. government neglects to ask themselves questions like this because they remain too focused on passing punitive laws targeted explicitly at Russia.
So many moving parts comprise the machinations of geopolitical relations between two world powers that their minutiae can overwhelm observers, causing their to overlook the forest for its trees. But could that view explain why the U.S. consistently demonizes Russia? Even if some members of Congress, the White House, and the media overlook the forest for its trees, any one of those minute details affecting current U.S.-Russia relations should prompt U.S. policymakers exercising caution before increasing its belligerence. The U.S. inferred it possessed inimitable prestige from winning the Cold War; thus, its unchallenged hegemony blinds it to changing geopolitical realities. This blindness to the consequences of its projections of power is exhibited when the U.S. Congress passed on December 11, 2014 the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014. Some of this Bill's following provisions summarized by Hogan Lovells should undoubtedly enhance Ukranian freedom:
- Defense sector: Within 30 days of the legislation’s enactment, the president is required to impose at least three sanctions measures (described below) on Rosoboronexport, the Russian state agency responsible for the import and export of defense and dual-use products, technology, and services. Upon or after 45 days of the legislation’s enactment, the president is also required to impose at least three sanctions measures on foreign entities the president determines are owned or controlled by the Russian government or Russian nationals that knowingly manufacture, sell, transfer, or assist in the transfer of defense articles transferred into Syria, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova (or certain other countries if the president makes a required determination related to such additional countries) without the consent of the internationally recognized government of that country. The sanctions measures must also be applied to those entities that knowingly provide financial, material, or technological support to an entity described above.
- Energy sector: Upon or after 45 days of the legislation’s enactment, the president may impose at least three sanctions measures (described below) on foreign persons that the president determines have knowingly made a significant investment in a special Russian crude oil project. The bill also authorizes the president, via the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security and the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), to impose additional licensing requirements or other restrictions on the export of items for use in the Russian energy sector. Finally, the bill also authorizes the president to prohibit investment in equity or debt, and impose an additional sanctions measure (described below) with respect to Gazprom, if the president determines that Gazprom is withholding significant natural gas supplies from NATO members and countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. The sanctions must be imposed within 45 days of such determination.
- Types of sanctions measures specified in the bill:
- denial of credit by the Export-Import Bank
- prohibition on procurement contracts with the U.S. government
- arms export ban
- dual-use export ban
- prohibition on dealings in property of sanctioned person (i.e., asset freeze/blocking measure)
- prohibition on U.S. banking transactions that involve interest of sanctioned person (effectively cutting of the sanctioned person from accessing the U.S. financial system including for payment processing in U.S. currency)
- prohibition on investment in new equity or new debt of sanctioned person issued after the date when the sanctions are impose (this measure targets debt longer than 30 days maturity for defense sector and longer than 90 days maturity for energy sector)
- exclusion from U.S. and visa revocation
- additional sanctions on executives of sanctioned entities (i.e., any of the above sanctions measures that could apply to individuals, including the visa ban, asset freezing, and other measure
- The legislation includes exceptions to the sanctions: for example, it specifies that the President does not have the authority to impose sanctions on the import of goods, procurement that is essential to national security, or certain pre-existing contracts as well as certain spare parts/components that are essential to U.S. products or production and routine servicing and maintenance of U.S. products to the extent alternative sources are not readily available (these parts/components and servicing are not limited to pre-existing contracts). Food, medicine, and medical devices are also covered by the exception (not limited to pre-existing contracts). The bill also provides for certain national security waivers.
- Sanctions on Foreign Financial Institutions: The president may impose sanctions on foreign (non-U.S.) financial institutions that facilitate certain defense- and energy related transactions or that facilitate “significant” financial transactions on behalf of any Russian SDN designated by OFAC pursuant to the Executive Orders issued in connection with the crisis in Ukraine. The bill does not define the term “significant financial transaction” but OFAC likely would apply the definition from the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 561, because it references those regulations for purposes of the definition of the term “foreign financial institution”. With respect to transactions on behalf of Russian SDNs, the provision may be triggered on or after 180 days of the legislation’s enactment. The sanction measure that would be imposed against a foreign financial institution is a prohibition on the opening, and a prohibition or strict condition on maintenance, of a correspondent or payable-through account in the United States by the foreign financial institution (essentially, cutting off such foreign financial institution from the ability to process USD transactions). This provision also includes a national security waiver. [21].
I cite in depth the provisions of these sanctions to illustrate by what degree the US Congress is determined to exercise power and influence of both specific entities and Russia's aggregate economy. Now their punitive measures include no provisions for responding to Ukraine's government actions, which implies their codifying into U.S. law Ukraine's victim status. Also, Ukraine's parliament has passed concurrent legislation showing they are emboldened by the U.S. Congress to serve as critical enablers of NATO's strategic encirclement of Russia:
Both the U.S. and Ukraine passing these laws demonstrate dual commitment to antagonizing Russia. The U.S. Congress passing of legislation referenced above includes requirements that the U.S. President execute certain sanctions against Russia. The Executive Branch's has engaged in anti-Russian measures, showing that the entire U.S. government has coordinated its efforts to punish Russia.With 269 lawmakers voting in favor, Ukraine's parliament approved, on 11 December 2014, a government action plan for 2015-2020, allowing for five percent of the country's annual GDP to be funneled into national security and defense. The plan also called on Ukraine to formally end its non-bloc status and join NATO, and for its armed forces to switch to NATO military standards by 2020. [22].
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Terrorist Financing Daniel Glaser testified in explicit terms during May 2014 to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
The Department of the Treasury is designing and implementing a strategy that uses our toolkit of targeted financial measures to raise the costs to Russia of its actions. Our approach is a calibrated effort to impose immediate costs on Russia and to create conditions that will make Russia increasingly vulnerable to sanctions as the situation in Ukraine escalates. To this end, Treasury has targeted not only corrupt former Ukrainian officials, Crimean separatists, and their backers in the Russian government, but also individuals in President Putin’s inner circle who have important interests and holdings throughout the Russian economy. [23].This language suggests moral certainty based on nothing more than a priori assertions that those who oppose the "Maidan" revolution and the resultant regime that took power deserve economic punishment. Moreover, Crimean people who voted overwhelmingly in a public referendum to secede from Ukraine are deemed pejoratively "separatists." The U.S. Treasury recognized no legal, historical, or social reasons explaining Crimea's use of a referendum to determine its future as a sovereign body.
The legality of Crimea's secession referendum are subject to varying interpretations of the Ukranian Constitution. Words and concepts such as "autonomy" possess enough intrinsic vagueness, allowing both supporters and opponents of secession to claim their respective positions are legitimate. Nonetheless, legal precedent appears to support the legality of Crimea's referendum. For example:
Suffice it to remember the 2010 International Court of Justice ruling on Kosovo which in fact recognized as legal this kind of unilateral declarations. The International Court found that because there is no international law preventing declarations of independence, Kosovo’s formal declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008 did not violate general international law. International Court of Justice President Hisashi Owada said international law contains no prohibition of declarations of independence and therefore Kosovo’s declaration did not violate general international law.
This ruling coincided with the US stance on the matter. In July 2009 the White House offered its advisory opinion to the International Court saying that the principle of territorial integrity does not contradict the right of non-state entities to peacefully declare independence,The declaration of independence did not violate any principle of territorial integrity because under international law, only states must comply with this principle, and not internal entities. But that is exactly what Crimea did. [24].
Of course, matters of power politics involve no genuine respect for either the meaning of laws or the mechanics of their application; rather, legal meanings are parsed ad hoc and ad nauseam to support each groups exercise of power to accomplish their preferred political objectives. The U.S. supported South Sudan's secession from Sudan proper in 2011 and Kosovo's secession from Serbia in 2008, while rejecting Crimea's referendum. President Obama justifies his support of those two acts of secession by claiming they are different than Crimea's. Thus, no hypocrisy there. Of course not.
In that context, Crimean seceding is illegitimate because their voters were coerced by Russia's military presence. The degree and impact of this military presence is debatable. The Western media condemns Russia's military presence in Crimea as an invasion and occupation. The historical and diplomatic ties between Russia and Crimea weaken this simplistic claim:
For those of us who willfully ignore the historical facts, it’s noteworthy that the Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet signed between Russia and Ukraine on May 28, 1997, permits Russia to lawfully maintain up to 25,000 troops, 24 artillery systems, 132 armored vehicles and 22 military planes on the Crimean peninsula. This agreement will be effective until 2017, and so it can be the most convincing logical justification for Russia’s military action in Crimea. [25].Of course, President "apples and oranges" Obama can dismiss the Partition Treaty provisions being inapplicable because there is a difference between troops merely being located in Crimea and their being used as a coercive force. If Obama were clearly concerned with learning the facts, he wouldn't ignore international observers who stated Crimea's referendum adhered to international standards for elections. (http://m.strategic-culture.org/news/2014/03/17/crimean-referendum-gunpoint-myth-intl-observers.html). Also, Obama shows no willingness to question the legitimacy of the power vacuum that occurred in Kiev on February 22, 2014. Did a popular election end the corrupt yet democratically elected government of Viktor Yanukovich on February 22, 2014? No he abdicated once anarchy and violence erupted ind Kiev's Maidan district. Hypocrisy perhaps?
While Obama diffuses accusations of the U.S. selectively supporting certain acts of secession while rejecting Crimea's secession referendum, Assistant Treasury Secretary Glaser testimony echoes the U.S. visceral anti-Putinism. His testimony also includes gloating that the U.S. Treasury' deployment of financial weapons have inflicted harm to the Russian economy:
Why is the U.S. Treasury's imposing sanctions on Russia that reduce its economic growth to nearly zero 0% considered "working?" Working for whom? Near zero economic growth could weaken Putin's legitimacy but only after imposing hardship upon the Russian people. Evidently, the well being of the Russian people are the collateral damage in this geopolitical conflict. Is another color or iconic image being prepared to complement rose, tulip, saffron, orange, velvet, cedar?Already, market analysts are forecasting significant continued outflows of both foreign and domestic capital and a further weakening of growth prospects for the year. The IMF has downgraded Russia’s growth outlook to 0.2 percent this year, and suggested that recession is not out of the question. This stands in stark contrast to previous IMF forecasts, which as recently as February were projecting 2 percent growth. It is clear that our sanctions policy is working [26].
The U.S. empire shows no concern for Russia's perceptions about the measures being taken against them. The Russian's perceptions about these measures reveal a nation convinced it is subject to NATO encirclement. Russia's concluding it faces NATO encirclement will certainly escalate military tensions. Is their conclusion a convenient construct or a factual observation? The West should analyze this question more deeply because Russia is certainly doing so.
For those who accept the master narrative of Russia seeking to increase its power on the global geopolitical stage by reasserting itself within the eastern bloc, then other analyses warrant no attention. But, for those who believe that Russia's current views on the causal factors contributing to instability deserve an audience, I recommend reviewing several presentations made at the Russian Ministry of Defense's third Moscow Conference on International Security that occurred on May 23, 2014. The Burke Chair of the U.S. based think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) prepared a summary of the presentations delivered at this conference. The speakers included prominent Russian and Belorussian policy making officials. They expressed views that suggest the various Color Revolutions (ranging from Czechoslovakia in 1989 to the Krygyzstan most recently in 2010) are faux-revolts conceived and executed to install U.S.-NATO-friendly regimes. Also, for example, they cite a significant increase of NATO's exercises conducted in the Baltic region during 2011-13 . [27]. The various presentations cover several topics, but all concur that the U.S.-NATO regime seeks to encircle Russia. That conclusion contrasts with the U.S. view that Russia is an aspiring empire whose crimes inflict too much harm to warrant diplomatic solutions. Yes, we can review speeches and comments from Western policymakers expressing their preference for diplomatic solutions. But, such diplomatic solutions are only presented after the West falsely accuses Russia of invading Ukraine, Crimea, and shooting down civilian airliners, etc. Consequently, the content of Western "diplomatic" solutions involve less compromises and more of an attempt to impose its will on Russia.
Perception is reality. Russia is too significant a world power to discount their Reality. You can dismiss their perceptions as baseless propaganda, or you can assess their perceptions against the current geopolitical conditions. US-NATO's assault on the Russian economy suggests the U.S. will continue its dismissiveness toward Russia's concerns. So we common persons should assess Russia's perception that Color Revolutions are western pretexts to encircle Russia. This chain of events alters my perception of history from 1989-present. Rather than our living through some sort of End of History, we are living through World War Three. Who will stop this?
1. Steven Mufson and Tom Hamburger. "Jaime Dimon himself called to urge support for the derivatives rule in the spending bill." Washington Post Wonkblog. Dec 11, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/12/11/the-item-that-is-blowing-up-the-budget-deal/
2. Jonathan Weisman and Eric Lipton. "In New Congress, Wall St. Pushes to Undermine Dodd-Frank Reform." The New York Times. Jan. 13, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/business/economy/in-new-congress-wall-st-pushes-to-undermine-dodd-frank-reform.html?_r=0
3. Ibid.
4. Sarotte, Mary Elise. 1989: The Struggle To Create Post-Cold War Europe. Princeton U of P. 2009. location 206 of 349.
5. Ibid. 111 of 349.
6. Ibid. 112.
7. Kessler, Glenn. "The GOP claim that Obama scrapped a missile defense system as a 'gift to Putin.' March 28, 2014. The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2014/03/28/the-gop-claim-that-obama-scrapped-a-missile-defense-system-as-a-gift-to-putin/
8. Ibid.
9. Brezizinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Geostrategic Imperatives. Basic Books. New York. 1997. location 437 of 3639. Kindle version.
10. Ibid. 460.
11. F. William Engdahl. Full Spectrum Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy In The New World Order. Published by edition.engdahl Wiesbaden. 2009. loc 947 of 4586. Kindle edition.
12. Dana Bash, John King, and Jill Dougherty. "Bush: Georgia 'beacon of liberty." May 11, 2005. CNN.com International. http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/05/10/bush.tuesday/
13. Kandelaki, Giorgi. "Georgia's Rose Revolution: A Participant's Perspective." United States Institute of Peace. Special Report 167. July 2006. www.usip.org.
14. Editorial. "Georgia: petals drop off the rose revolution." The Guardian. September 30, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/sep/30/georgia-rose-wilted
15. C.J. Chivers. "State's secrets: a cache of diplomatic cables provides a chronicle of the United States relations with the world." The New York Times. Dec 1, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/world/europe/02wikileaks-georgia.html?_r=0
16. F. William Engdahl. "Foreign Bankers Rape Ukraine." NEO: New Eastern Outlook. Dec 18, 2014. http://journal-neo.org/2014/12/18/foreign-bankers-rape-ukraine/
17. Jettie Ward, Alice Martin-Prevel, Frederich Mousseau. Anuradha Mittal and Melissa Moore eds. "Walking on the West Side: The World Bank and the IMF in the Ukraine Conflict." The Oakland Institute. 2014. http://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/OurBiz_Brief_Ukraine.pdf
18. Ibid.
19. Cohen, Josh. "Ukraine Can't Afford the IMF's 'Shock' Therapy." Sep 10, 2014. Foreign Policy. http:/foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/10/ukraine-cant-afford-the-imfs-shock-therapy/
20. "Ukraine Crisis: Transcript of leaked Nuland-Pylatt call." BBC News Europe. Feb 07, /2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957
21. "Sanctions Alert 16 December 2014: U.S. Congress Passes Legislation to Expand Sanctions Against Russia; EU Expands Sanctions Against Russia." Hogan
Lovells. http://ehoganlovells.com/cv/b207dd1e179850248dc641c8dc3df0d1d51c427822. "Military Budget." Global Security.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/budget.htm accessed Jan 06, 2014
23. Glaser, Daniel. "Testimony of Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing Daniel Glaser before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.'' May 06, 2014. U.S. Department of the Treasury. http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2385.aspx#.VKhA6gNyEIU.hotmail
24. Iskenderov, Pyotr. "From Kosovo to Crimea.'' Strategic Culture Foundation." March 28, 2014. http://m.strategic-culture.org/news/2014/03/28/from-kosovo-to-crimea.html
25. Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya. "The 2014 Elections: A Battle of the Billionaires that Has Split Ukraine." Nov 01, 2014. Strategic Culture Foundation. http://m.strategic-culture.org/news/2014/11/01/2014-rada-elections-battle-billionaires-that-has-split-ukraine.html
26. Glaser. "Testimony.......Treasury."
27. Cordesman, Anthony. "Russia and the 'Color Revolution': A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the U.S. and the West (Key Briefs). Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Burke Chair in Strategy. May 28,2014. http://csis.org/files/publication/140529_Russia_Color_Revolution_Summary.pdf The CSIS prepared this summary of the presentations delivered at the Russian Ministry of Defense's third Moscow Conference on International Security that occurred on May 23, 2014.
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